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I. Introduction*  
Globalization has become a catchword for a number of political, social, environmental and 
economic trends that are supposed to present challenges on a worldwide scale. In an economic 
sense, globalization can be best interpreted as an increase in the international division of labor, 
caused by an increase of international flows of foreign direct investment (FDI) relative to steadily 
increasing international trade flows (Nunnenkamp et al. 1994). A more stable international 
macroeconomic environment with a focus on monetary and fiscal discipline, the liberalization of 
trade initiated by successive GATT rounds, and the deregulation of financial markets and other 
business services such as banking and insurance have fostered the ongoing globalization of 
production and markets. Furthermore, thanks to the micro-electronics revolution, new 
communication technologies have evolved that allow for the international diffusion of new 
production and organization technologies at low cost. The bottom line is that globalization 
represents a substantial increase and a new quality in the international division of labor as large 
countries such as China, India, and Indonesia become part of the world economy. Industrialized 
countries have adjusted differently to these new challenges. 
In a global economy, free trade and capital flows between countries with different factor 
endowments tend to put adjustment pressure on the relatively scarce factors of production (Stolper 
and Samuelson 1941). Especially in the Triad of the United States, Japan, and the EU, low-skilled 
labor is the relatively scarce factor of production, compared with physical and human capital. The 
adjustment pressure on low-skilled labor results from a fall in the price of goods which are 
produced by using low-skilled labor intensively. This price decline is the consequence of an 
increase in supply, since developing countries are making use of their abundant labor supply and 
are exporting labor intensive products. Hence, employment and earnings of low-skilled labor in 
industrialized countries tend to be negatively affected in the era of globalization. 
The ensuing adjustment needs in industrialized countries have traditionally been contained by 
restricting labor intensive imports and, thereby, protecting low-skilled workers. However, the 
effectiveness of such policies is increasingly reduced in an integrating world economy. First, the 
higher mobility of capital and the easier access to new technologies render it feasible for developing 
countries to upgrade their exports. Second, technological innovations as well as lower transaction 
and information costs allow for an international fragmentation of production processes.1 Moreover, 
trade barriers may be circumvented by relocating production, which, in turn, may increase trade and 
competition in domestic areas previously protected against international competition. That is, 
                                                 
*   We thank three anonymous referees for helpful comments on an earlier version. 
1    UNCTAD-DTCI (1994: 206) notes that "the greater dispersal of TNC operations is what most distinguishes 
integrated international production from other forms of TNC strategies ... and individual value-added activities are 
likely to become more dispersed transnationally".   2 
 
globalization largely destroys the natural protection of less mobile factors of production, which may 
have existed before due to technological complementarities between skilled and low-skilled 
workers in advanced countries. Put differently, globalization means that more jobs are affected by 
international competition (Campbell 1993). 
This paper first discusses the theoretical background for the presumed labor market implications of 
globalization. Section III compares recent labor market developments in the Triad, and presents 
some empirical support for the globalization hypothesis. Focusing on the EU, Section IV highlights 
the relative performance of the Triad with regard to international trade and FDI flows, which 
mirrors the different adjustment patterns - and labor market experiences - of Europe, Japan, and the 
United States. Section V concludes by briefly discussing alternative policy options. 
II.  Globalization, Structural Change, and Relative Wages 
The presumed effects of globalization result in a closer integration of worldwide labor markets (see 
also UNCTAD-DTCI 1994: chapter IV). This development favors high-skilled workers in 
industrialized countries, who have relatively few foreign competitors. By contrast, low-skilled 
workers face an almost perfectly elastic supply of low-paid competitors around the world. For them, 
globalization tends to amplify the adjustment pressure that would have resulted from international 
trade alone. The net effect of globalization is likely to be positive for the economies involved, 
because of the additional gains to be realized from trade and investment relations.2 However, low-
skilled workers may actually lose as a result of globalization, as long as there is no compensating 
change in the production structure of industrialized countries. 
The theoretical framework underlying this reasoning can be outlined in a simple diagram 
(Figure 1).3 The axes denote quantities of (physical and human) capital and (low-skilled) labor. The 
right angles represent so-called unit value isoquants, i.e., combinations of capital and labor that are 
required to produce, say, one dollar's worth of output.4 The unit value isoquants are drawn for three 
different sectors: the automobile industry which is assumed to be relatively human and physical 
capital intensive, the chemical industry which is assumed to be physical capital intensive, and 
textiles and clothing, which is assumed to be the most low-skilled labor intensive industry in this 
illustrative example. 
The figure also displays two unit isocost lines, which represent combinations of capital and labor 
that cost just one dollar to employ. In the initial situation, the isocost line is drawn tangential to the 
                                                 
2   For a more skeptical view of the presumed positive welfare effects of globalization, see Renshaw (1993). 
3  The following paragraphs draw on Leamer (1992). 
4  The isoquants are drawn as right angles to indicate that the ratio of capital to labor is assumed to be technologically 
fixed. This assumption is immaterial for the qualitative results derived below.   3 
 
unit value isoquants of all three sectors. If this line falls below of one of the unit value isoquants, 
the costs of production in this industry exceed the value of output and, hence, no output would be 
produced. By contrast, if the isocost line crosses a unit value isoquant, production costs are lower 
than the value of output in this industry; excess profits would attract a resource inflow, thereby 
either raising the factor prices or reducing the product prices so that, finally, the tangency condition 
would be restored. 



















Source:  Based on Leamer (1992). 
The impact of globalization for advanced countries can be demonstrated by an outward shift of the 
unit value isoquants for textiles and clothing. Globalization means first of all an increase in the 
worldwide supply of relatively low-skilled labor and second, the general availability of relatively 
ubiquitous technologies. According to the Rybczynsky Theorem (Rybczynsky 1955), this should 
lead to an increase in the supply of low-skilled labor intensive goods and of goods that can be 
produced with standardized technologies. This increase in supply should reduce the relative price of 
such goods. A declining product price implies an increase in quantities of inputs to keep the unit 
value constant, and, therefore, the outward shift of the unit value isoquants. From the point of view 
of advanced countries, this shift will be strongest where the underlying supply effects can be 
expected to have the strongest effect on the relative product prices.   4 
 
In the diagram, the strongest shift in relative prices has been assumed for textiles and clothing, 
which is the most low-skilled labor intensive industry. The new theoretical equilibrium is given by 
a new isocost line, which is tangential only to automobiles and chemicals. According to the 
diagram, advanced countries would not produce textiles and clothing any longer, and instead 
specialize on the more human and physical capital intensive production of automobiles and 
chemicals. The new equilibrium implies a reduced wage for low-skilled labor, relative to the factor 
reward for human and physical capital. This is indicated by the new intersection of the isocost line 
with the labor axis at 1/ w∗.5 
The upshot of all this is that the wage for low-skilled labor will tend to fall if globalization reduces 
product prices in the labor intensive industries relative to the prices in the (physical and human) 
capital intensive industries. In the absence of an exogenous source of productivity growth, low-
skilled workers in advanced countries would be worse off under conditions of globalization than 
under conditions of nationally segmented production and markets, which is the basic message of the 
Stolper-Samuelson Theorem. 
Some of the assumptions underlying this purely theoretical argumentation are that international 
product prices are given, that there is a high elasticity of substitution between capital and labor, that 
the advanced countries' factor supplies actually are in the high wage cone, and that labor-rich 
developing countries are in the low wage cone. In the absence of any barriers hindering 
international transactions, there would be no output of low-skilled labor intensive goods in 
advanced countries, and, correspondingly, no output of human capital intensive goods in 
developing countries. In reality, transport costs, temporary economies of scale, and less than perfect 
substitution between capital and labor due to immobile inputs all contribute to maintaining an 
industry structure that would be obsolete otherwise. The message from theory to be stressed is that, 
in the presence of globalization, there are economic forces at work which push for moving the 
production of low-skilled labor intensive (final and intermediate) goods to developing countries, 
with the consequence of a widening wage gap between skilled and low-skilled workers in advanced 
countries. Some support for this reasoning comes from comparative empirical evidence for the 
labor market.6  
III.  In Search of Globalization Effects 
Globalization, Labor Markets, and Relative Prices 
                                                 
5  The wage is given by the inverse of the intersection of the isocost line with the labor axis. The equation for the 
isocost line reads 1= + wL rK , where  w  is the wage for low-skilled labor  L , and  r  is the factor reward for 
physical and human capital  K . At the intersection of the isocost line with the labor axis,  K  equals zero. Therefore, 
Lw = 1/  at this point. 
6  For a recent overview of different labor market experiences in OECD countries, see OECD (d).   5 
 
While the three major players in the world economy should have been confronted with similar 
adjustment problems raised by the globalization of production and markets, labor market outcomes 
were strikingly different. EU economies contrast significantly with Japan and the United States:7 In 
Europe, unemployment rose sharply throughout the 1980s, while employment remained unchanged 
or fell. In Japan and the United States, employment rose, while unemployment remained constant or 
even declined. A similar pattern prevails for the structure of unemployment with regard to different 
skill levels. The lower end of the spectrum of qualifications is conventionally assessed by proxies 
such as long-term unemployment and youth unemployment. These measures indicate that 
unemployment of low-skilled workers is a more severe problem in EU economies than in Japan and 
the United States (Figure 2). What is more, the increase in low-skilled unemployment since the 
early 1980s seems to be most pronounced in EU economies, with the exception of Germany for the 
case of youth unemployment.8 Abstracting from its low level, there is also a relatively strong 
increase in low-skilled unemployment in Japan. 
Changes in the distribution of earnings between low-skilled and high-skilled workers help to 
explain this puzzling picture, at least partly. It can reasonably be assumed that the higher end of the 
earnings distribution represents the wages of high-skilled workers, and the lower end represents the 
wages of low-skilled workers. Figure 3 then suggests a declining or unchanged wage gap in major 
EU economies and in Japan. By contrast, the wage gap widened in the United Kingdom and, 
particularly, in the United States. This leads to the conclusion that rising unemployment of low-
skilled workers is the price that continental Europe has to pay for insufficient  relative wage 
flexibility. Japan seems to face the same problem, although at substantially lower levels. The 
remaining puzzle is the case of the United Kingdom, where wage flexibility apparently did not 
hinder an increase in low-skilled unemployment rates. 
Changes in the structure of employment in manufacturing further support the proposition that 
economic policies in Europe were inappropriate to deal with the challenges raised by globalization 
(Figure 4). The EU experienced a drastic cut in employment in textiles and clothing, even relative 
to overall declining manufacturing employment. This contrasts sharply with the United States, 
where the increase in wage dispersion helped to secure more employment in textiles and clothing. 
At the same time, employment creation in capital (chemicals) and skill intensive (automobiles) 
industries  remained small in the EU as compared to Japan and the United States. As it seems, 
structural change in employment required by fiercer worldwide competition was handled most 
successfully in Japan, where economy-wide employment problems were largely avoided. The 
average figures for the EU disguise the fact that the structural pattern of Germany is very similar to 
the structural pattern of Japan, but the major difference is that Japan's manufacturing employment 
                                                 
7  The following observations refer to data provided by OECD (b). 
8   The reported increase in youth unemployment rates is most likely to be underestimated for the case of Germany, 
Italy, the United Kingdom and the United States because the data include a break in the series.   6 
 
increased at about 0.4 percent per year in 1979-1996, while Germany's manufacturing employment 
declined at about 1.2 percent per year in 1979-1994 (OECD e). US labor markets have responded to 
increasing globalization by remarkably flexible wage policies, but seem to lag behind Japan in 
terms of employment restructuring towards capital and skill intensive industries. Europe ranks only 
third within the Triad in terms of successful structural adjustment: Larger relative employment 
losses in labor intensive industries, smaller relative employment gains in capital intensive 
industries, and relative losses in skill intensive industries where other countries report relative 
employment gains.  































a Percentage of total unemployment, 12 months and over. — bAge 20-24, data for Germany, Italy, 
the United Kingdom and the United States include a break in the series. 
Source: OECD (b).   8 
 














aPercentage change in the earnings of high paid workers (decile 9) relative to the earnings of low 
paid workers (decile 1). — b1979-1994. — c1981-1993. — d1979-1993. — e1979-1995, males 
only. 
Source: OECD (b). 

















aFor each industry, annual rate of change of employment minus annual rate of change of 
employment in total manufacturing (percent); ISIC categories; values for 1996 partly based on first 
three quarters. — bUnweighted average of France, Germany and United Kingdom; France and 
Germany: 1979-1994. 
Source: OECD (e). 
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Although the observed labor market outcomes are in line with the hypothesis of an increasing 
globalization of markets and production, one has to concede that other explanations such as 
exogenous labor saving technological progress are also compatible with the empirical facts.9 
However, it is open to question to which extent technological change itself is driven by the trend 
towards globalization. That is, globalization may affect the labor market either directly, or 
indirectly through technological change. According to Figure 1, the impaired wage and employment 
prospects of low-skilled labor in advanced economies are caused by a fall in the relative price of 
labor intensive products. An important empirical question is, thus, whether the relative price of low-
skilled labor intensive goods has declined. We focus on the relative price of clothing, which clearly 
is a low-skilled labor intensive sector. A comparison with the relative prices for other sectors may 
provide hints on the relevance of globalization effects on the labor market, despite a certain degree 
of ambiguity in classifying products as physical or human capital intensive. Especially chemicals 
can also be considered as a skill intensive industry, whereas iron and steel as well as textiles are 
fairly standardized physical capital intensive industries. 
Table 1 presents changes in US producer price indexes between 1982 and 1995. Since the United 
States constitutes a relatively large and open market, the price data can be interpreted as rough 
indicators of relative world market prices. The entries show that the relative price of clothing has 
fallen indeed, compared with the prices of goods here classified as human capital intensive. The 
evidence with respect to physical capital intensive goods is mixed. Yet, US data tend to support the 
relative price changes predicted by the Stolper-Samuelson Theorem given that iron and steel as well 
as textiles are more standardized goods than chemicals, the production of which requires relatively 
more human capital. This result is not confined to a specific recent year, as is shown by the fairly 
steady changes in 1993-1995 and by a comparison with data taken from Lücke (1993) for 1978-
1987. 
Globalization, Trade, and FDI 
Instead of looking at labor market outcomes or relative price changes, the relevance of the 
globalization hypothesis can also be assessed by an empirical analysis of international trade and 
FDI flows. If the globalization hypothesis holds, FDI outflows of investor countries should be 
positively correlated with both exports to, and imports from host economies. This is because 
globalization encourages an international fragmentation of production, so that firms may place their 
production around the world, sourcing this component from one country and that component from 
another  
 
                                                 
9  On the relevance of trade and technological progress for determining labor market outcomes, see, e.g., Krugman 
and Lawrence (1994), Lawrence and Slaughter (1993), and Wood (1994).   10 
 













Human capital intensive    
Industrial machinery and equipment  143.7  146.2  149.8  5.08 
Transport  equipment  133.7 137.2 139.7  5.50 
Motor  vehicles  134.2 131.4 140.3  .. 
Physical capital intensive       
Chemicals  128.2 132.1 142.5  4.31 
Iron and steel  116.0  122.0  128.8  3.88 
Textilesb  115.3 114.8 118.6  3.11 
Labor intensive       
Clothing  123.2 123.5 124.2  3.67 
aUS commodity code. — bAverage of code numbers 032-034. 
Source:  Lücke (1993); US Department of Labor (various issues). 
country, where the direction of sourcing may change continuously due to changes in 
"kaleidoscopic" comparative advantage (Bhagwati and Dehejia 1994): small changes in costs can 
cause comparative advantage to shift suddenly from one country to another. Put differently, new 
production locations are equally likely to export to, and import from investor countries once these 
locations become integrated into the international division of labor through FDI as the major 
instrument of technology transfer.  
An alternative hypothesis would be that FDI flows to host economies are just a substitute for trade 
flows in order to circumvent trade barriers. If this were the case, FDI flows should be negatively 
correlated with exports of investor countries. Moreover, FDI flows should be by and large 
uncorrelated with imports of investor countries from host countries, if FDI flows do not indicate an 
internationally fragmented production structure, but were aiming exclusively at the local market of 
host economies. 
Table 2 presents simple cross-section correlation coefficients for bilateral trade and FDI flows for 
Germany, Japan, and the United States in recent years. German and Japanese FDI flows to host 
countries, including developing and industrialized countries, are positively correlated in a 
statistically significant way with trade flows (both exports and imports); and the same broad picture 
holds for lagged FDI flows (one and two years, respectively). Hence the higher are contemporary 
and past FDI flows to foreign countries in  absolute value, the higher are German and Japanese   11 
 
exports to the host countries and the higher are German and Japanese imports from these countries. 
This finding is in conflict with the widespread belief that FDI simply replaces trade, whereas it is in 
line with the globalization hypothesis. The correlation between bilateral trade and FDI flows is 
much weaker for the United States. This can be attributed to some peculiarities with respect to the 
sectoral and regional distribution of US FDI outflows.10 The primary sector, in which globalization 
strategies play  
 
Table 2 — Trade and FDI Flows: Pearson Correlation Coefficientsa,b 
Year  FDI vs Exports  FDI vs Imports 
 t t+1  t+2 t t+1  t+2 
 1.  Germany 
1989  0.67** 0.66** 0.62** 0.63** 0.61** 0.61** 
  (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) 
1990  0.70** 0.67** 0.68** 0.66** 0.65** 0.66** 
  (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) (34) 
1991  0.59** 0.60**  -  0.58** 0.58**  - 
  (34) (34)    (34) (34)   
1992  0.72** -  -  0.69** -  - 
  (31)     (31)    
 2.  Japan 
1989  0.96** 0.95** 0.94** 0.89** 0.90** 0.89** 
  (40) (40) (40) (40) (39) (40) 
1990  0.94** 0.93** 0.93** 0.90** 0.89** 0.88** 
  (42) (42) (42) (41) (42) (42) 
1991  0.93** 0.93**  -  0.90** 0.89**  - 
  (44) (44)    (44) (44)   
1992  0.93** -  -  0.92** -  - 
  (42)     (41)    
  3. United States 
1989 0.19 0.20 0.19 0.07 0.09 0.07 
  (37) (37) (37) (37) (37) (37) 
1990 0.41**  0.43**  - 0.32*  0.31  - 
  (39) (39)    (39) (39)   
1991  0.35*  - -  0.24 - - 
  (38)     (38)    
*(**)indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent (1 percent) level. — aIn parentheses: number of countries. — bt 
refers to contemporary trade and FDI flows; t+1 (t+2) refers to lagged (one and two periods) FDI flows. 
Source:  Nunnenkamp et al. (1994). 
                                                 
10  For a detailed discussion of these peculiarities, see Nunnenkamp et al. (1994: 82-88).   12 
 
a minor role, accounted for a relatively high share of US FDI outflows.11 Furthermore, US investors 
focused relatively strongly on Latin American host countries, where market-seeking FDI dominated 
over efficiency-seeking FDI (Agarwal et al. 1991). 
The robustness of the trade-FDI correlations reported in Table 2 can be tested by introducing 
market size of host countries as an additional explanatory variable. The question then is whether 
market size, as measured by Gross Domestic Product (GDP) in the host country, or FDI flows have 
a larger statistical impact on trade flows. Market size should not dominate the statistical impact of 
FDI, if globalization strategies explain the positive link between FDI and trade flows. Table A1 
presents beta coefficients which were derived from a cross-country regression of bilateral exports 
(imports) on bilateral FDI flows and GDP in the host country.12 Since beta coefficients are inde-
pendent of the units of measurement, they can be used to compare the relative impact of the 
explanatory variables. The results are largely in line with a priori expectations. For a statistical 
explanation of bilateral Japanese trade data, FDI flows seem to be more important than market size. 
For Germany, both market size and FDI flows seem to be important statistical determinants of 
trade, but the weight of FDI has increased in recent years. These findings confirm the globalization 
hypothesis. Not surprisingly, market size seems to be more important than FDI flows in most 
calculations for the United States. This finding means that given the data at hand, the globalization 
hypothesis can neither be confirmed nor rejected for the United States. It cannot be concluded that 
globalization is irrelevant for US investors, since the results still point to a positive correlation of 
FDI and trade flows. 
All in all, our findings support the consensus result of empirical research in this field: FDI and trade 
flows are positively correlated,13 which is in line with the globalization hypothesis.14 Rather than 
FDI causing trade, or trade causing FDI in a unidirectional way, the direction and extent of trade 
and FDI flows seem to be simultaneously determined by globalization strategies. As a consequence, 
FDI is not only positively correlated with exports of investor countries to host countries, but also 
with exports of host countries to investor countries.  
                                                 
11  A more appropriate test of the globalization hypothesis would be to correlate trade flows with bilateral FDI flows 
for manufacturing industries, rather than with total FDI flows. Yet sectorally disaggregated data on FDI flows by 
host countries are not available from official statistical sources. OECD statistics report FDI flows by either regional 
or sectoral disaggregation; US statistics report disaggregated FDI stocks, but not FDI flows. 
12  Beta coefficients measure the change in exports (imports) in standard deviation units for a unit change in each 
explanatory variable in standard deviation units, holding constant the other variable. 
13  This result is also confirmed by a recent empirical analysis which focuses on extra-EU trade and investment flows 
(Greenaway 1993). 
14  However, the regression results also demonstrate that there is no clear-cut pattern regarding trade and investment 
flows that can be identified by a simple cross-section analysis. The different results for the three major investor 
countries indicate that the positive correlation between FDI and trade flows should be carefully interpreted. 
Obviously, other variables such as different productivity levels, different sectoral and regional preferences of 
investors, and the sometimes volatile character of FDI flows should be taken into account for a more comprehensive 
analysis of cross-country trade flows.   13 
 
IV.  Trade and FDI Performance of Triad Members 
As argued before, globalization represents a substantial increase and a new quality in the 
international division of labor, largely because of the integration of various developing and 
transition economies into the world economy. This involved similar challenges for all members of 
the Triad. Yet, different adjustment patterns are not confined to wages and employment. Likewise, 
the relative performance of Triad members with regard to FDI and trade flows reveals interesting 
differences. 
The following discussion indicates that the EU has made relatively little use of the opportunities for 
cost savings through global sourcing, and of profit chances through penetrating newly emerging 
markets. At the same time, the EU has become a major target of globalization strategies by foreign 
competitors. On world markets, the EU has been outperformed by both Japan and the United States. 
The share of EU exports (excluding intra-EU trade) in world manufacturing exports declined by 5 
percentage points to 17.1 percent in the period 1980-1994 (UN various issues). By contrast, the 
corresponding loss was only about one percentage point for the United States, and Japan increased 
its market share from 10.8 percent in 1980 to 12.1 percent in 1994. On the import side, the EU has 
become a major target of trade expansion and globalization strategies by traditional and newly 
emerging competitors. Since the 1980s, the EU's trade balance for high-tech products has worsened 
progressively (Commission of the EC 1993); the growth rate of EU imports of high-tech products 
was nearly twice the growth rate of the corresponding EU exports. Arguably, European integration 
has retarded the globalization of EU investors, which tend to prefer regionalization strategies. 
New competitive suppliers 
The Internal Market program, launched by the EU Commission in 1985, represented a major step 
towards the deepening of EU integration, and was widely expected to stimulate intra-EU trade. Yet, 
EU imports of manufactures from non-member countries increased at a higher rate than intra-EU 
imports between 1980 and 1994; the share of intra-EU imports in total EU imports declined from 63 
to 57 percent (Table 3).15 In addition to the United States and Japan, developing countries have 
established themselves as serious competitors on EU markets. All non-OECD countries taken 
together raised their import market share by nearly five percentage points to about 17 percent in 
1994. The share of all non-OECD countries in extra-EU imports (1994: 40 percent) was comparable 
with their share in total imports of Japan and the United States in 1994, while the increase in their 
import shares since 1980 was clearly more pronounced in the two latter markets than in the EU. 
                                                 
15  UN data suggest that the share of intra-EU imports in total EU imports of manufactures declined particularly 
between 1990 and 1993, and recovered somewhat in 1994 (UN, various issues).   14 
 
As concerns manufacturing exports by developing countries to the EU, the first generation of newly 
industrializing economies (NIEs) in Asia (Hong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan  
 
Table 3 — Regional Structure of Manufactured Imports of the EU, Japan and the United States, 
1980 and 1994(percent) 
 
Importing 
 Imports  from:  Memo-
randum: 















   All manufacturesc 
EU(12)  1980  63.0 4.8 9.8  12.3 3.0 0.4 0.4 0.7 383.2 
  1994  56.9 6.0 9.2  17.2 3.9 1.9 2.5 0.7  1014.2 
Japan  1980  26.3  –  38.4  27.2  15.4 2.2 3.6 1.9  24.2 
  1994  21.7  – 29.0 43.0 15.8  8.8 14.1  0.7  132.5 
United  States  1980  25.0  24.5  –  27.8  14.9 2.2 0.6 5.7 116.1 
  1994  17.3 22.3  – 40.9 13.4  6.1  7.5 10.1  525.1 
   Machinery and transport equipmentd 
EU(12)  1980  64.4 7.8  12.6 6.7 1.7 0.2 0.0 0.4 164.6 
  1994  57.1 9.6  11.7  12.9 4.9 1.7 1.2 0.5 489.8 
Japan  1980  27.0  –  50.7  14.6 8.7 1.4 0.1 2.2  8.4 
  1994  21.3  –  40.3  33.7  18.4 9.9 4.7 0.4  52.9 
United  States  1980  25.5  34.9  –  16.1 8.2 2.4 0.0 4.5  63.8 
  1994  15.6  30.8  –  32.6  13.4 6.0 3.0 9.5 314.6 
   Chemicalse 
EU(12)  1980  71.1 1.4  10.1 8.4 0.2 0.1 0.4 0.8  60.6 
  1994  69.7 2.3 8.0 8.5 0.7 0.2 0.8 0.7 159.9 
Japan  1980  28.8  –  42.8  17.7 7.0 1.7 2.9 2.7  5.9 
  1994  36.6  –  31.7  20.0 7.4 3.1 4.4 1.7  19.9 
United  States  1980  39.9 8.3  –  14.4 1.4 0.4 1.3 6.7  9.0 
  1994  38.8  12.5  –  20.6 4.1 1.0 2.2 7.2  35.5 
   Clothing and textilesf 
EU(12)  1980  60.2 1.1 3.9  27.7 9.6 1.3 1.6 1.6  44.7 
  1994  47.2 0.8 1.9  40.9 5.5 4.5 6.6 0.7 100.1 
Japan  1980  22.3  – 6.7  67.4  43.0 3.0  16.4 0.7  3.3 
  1994  13.8  – 5.9  79.2  17.6 6.6  48.5 0.2  20.5 
United  States  1980  11.7 6.4  –  79.5  50.8 4.3 4.5 9.2  9.5 
  1994  8.3  1.6  – 84.4 23.5 11.0 16.1 17.1  48.3 
aHong Kong, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China. — bIndonesia, Malaysia, Philippines, 
Thailand. — cSITC 5 + 6 + 7 + 8 - 67 - 68. — dSITC 7. — eSITC 5. – fSITC 65 + 84. 
Source: OECD  (a).   15 
 
Province of China) still figures most prominently (Table 3). However, other Asian developing 
countries are catching up quickly. Especially since the mid-1980s, booming market shares are 
recorded for China and ASEAN countries. China and ASEAN countries have not only emerged as 
new competitors in the EU, but even more so in Japan and the United States.16 Competition from 
developing countries is likely to gain further momentum as many Latin American countries have 
stabilized and liberalized their economies recently. Latin America is thus better prepared to 
participate in the international division of labor. As a matter of fact, Latin American countries 
already succeeded to raise their share in US imports. Likewise, additional import pressure will 
result from the proceeding integration of Central and Eastern Europe into the world economy. This 
will affect especially the EU, which can be considered the "natural" trading partner of Central and 
Eastern Europe. 
Table 3 further reveals that the growth of developing countries' exports to the EU, Japan and the 
United States  was not restricted to traditional industries such as clothing and textiles. Competitive 
pressure was strong in human capital intensive sectors such as machinery and transport equipment 
as well.17 Asian developing countries have moved rapidly into sophisticated segments of 
manufacturing. This development has been indirectly supported by trade policies of industrialized 
countries, notably in the EU. Market access for low-cost suppliers was restricted for products 
considered "sensitive" (e.g., textiles and clothing, iron and steel) so that different factor 
endowments were partly denied their role in shaping the international division of labor. Developing 
countries were more or less forced to compete on markets for more sophisticated products. Their 
chances to do so were enhanced by greater mobility of financial capital and easier access to new 
technologies since the early 1980s. The changing pattern of imports of the Triad thus provides 
indications as to the limited effectiveness of trade policy in restricting import competition. As a 
result of protection granted to ailing industries, part of the adjustment burden has been shifted 
towards sectors in which advanced economies should possess comparative advantages. 
The EU as a target of globalization strategies 
In the era of globalization, worldwide sourcing and marketing have become major parameters of 
competitiveness by offering cost savings and new sales outlets. The EU figured prominently among 
the principal targets of globalization strategies by international investors. The region attracted 
nearly half of world FDI inflows in 1989-1991, and still about 36 percent in 1992-1995, whereas its 
share was 30 percent in 1983-1988 (Table 4). FDI stocks held by US and Japanese investors in the 
                                                 
16  China and ASEAN(4) together accounted for 10 percent of extra-EU imports in 1994, as compared with 23 percent 
of Japan's imports and 14 percent of US imports (Table 3). 
17  For the case of the EU, see also  Commission of the EC (1993).   16 
 
EU increased relative to their overall outward FDI stocks.18 The EU's attractiveness for foreign risk 
capital was largely because international investors anticipated the completion of the Internal Market 
and its extension to prospective EU member countries (Hiemenz et al. 1994). Fears of restrictive 
EU trade policies may have induced FDI in some instances, e.g., Japanese investment in the 
automobile industry, as FDI provided a means to jump over protectionist fences. However, the 
larger part of FDI appears to be motivated by market integration (both in manufacturing and 
services) and cost advantages at the EU periphery, which did not only benefit EU producers but 
also outside investors. Somewhat ironically, European integration has strengthened the 
globalization of major competitors.  
Table 4 — Regional Distribution of FDI Inflows, 1983-1995 (percent) 
Host countries  1983-88a 1989-91a 1992-94a 1995b 
EU(15)  30.0 47.0 36.3 35.5 
Japan  0.4 0.7 0.8 0.0 
United  States  37.6 24.1 18.0 19.1 
Central and Eastern Europe  0.0  0.5  2.5  3.8 
Developing  countries  21.6 18.3 35.0 31.6 
Memorandum:      
World inflows (US$ 
billion) 
91.6 190.2 200.6 314.9 
aAnnual average. — bEstimates. 
Source:  UNCTAD-DTCI (1995: Annex Table 1); UNCTAD (1996: Annex Table 1). 
FDI flows to the EU should have contributed to the creation of new jobs in EU economies.19 
However, earlier expectations according to which the Internal Market program would help 
significantly to overcome competitive disadvantages of domestic industries were not well founded. 
Exactly the opposite may happen, if policy makers and entrepreneurs in the EU consider regional 
integration to be an alternative to globalization and ignore the effects of fiercer competition on 
labor markets.  
                                                 
18  Comparing 1984 and 1994, the EU's share in US FDI stocks increased from 34 to 42 percent; the respective shares 
in Japanese FDI stocks amounted to 9 and 18 percent (OECD c). 
19  Hamill (1993: 92), however, expects major job losses in Europe as a consequence of TNC restructuring. For a 
comprehensive assessment of the role of TNCs in generating, displacing or relocating jobs, see UNCTAD-DTCI 
(1994: chapter IV).   17 
 
Regionalization versus globalization of EU investors 
The Internal Market program provoked unprecedented FDI flows among EU member countries. 
The intra-EU share of overall EU FDI outflows soared from less than one third in 1985-1987 to 
more than half in 1991-1994 (Table 5). Non-EU hosts within Europe, too, attracted rising shares in 
EU FDI outflows, which can be attributed to the pending widening of European integration. The 
regional distribution of FDI outflows is consistent with the view that EU investors focused their 
attention on the emerging Internal Market. 
Table  5  — Regional Distribution of FDI Outflows of the EU, Japan and the United States,a 
1985-1994 (percent) 
Host countries  EUb  Japan  United  States 
  1985-87 1988-90 1991-94 1985-87 1988-90 1991-94 1985-87 1988-90 1991-94
Industrialized  countries  87.7 88.9 81.9 67.9 77.1 68.5 64.3 65.9 60.4 
      EU(12)  30.3 51.1 54.3 16.9 20.8 18.6 38.8 41.1 42.6 
      Other  Europe  3.3 4.2  12.0 0.8 1.3 0.9 5.4 6.5 6.4 
   US and Canada  50.5  29.7  18.0  46.1  48.6  43.5  –  –  – 
      Japan  0.6 0.9 0.1  –  –  – 3.1 2.7 2.2 
C e n t r a l   a n d              
Eastern  Europe  0.1 0.2 3.1 0.0 0.0 0.4  ..  .. 1.6 
Developing countriesc  9.5  9.1 12.1 32.1 22.9 31.5 36.9 33.7 37.6 
      Africa  0.7 1.1 1.0 1.1 1.1 1.2  -0.1  -1.8 0.5 
      Latin  America  5.6  4.9  5.8 17.9  8.9 10.0 33.0 29.2 25.1 
      Middle  East  0.6 0.6 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.9 0.4  -0.3 1.3 
   South and East Asia  2.2  1.7  4.6  12.7  12.2  18.8  3.5  6.3  10.3 
       DAEsd  1.8 1.1 3.0 8.3 9.7  10.0 3.2 5.4 8.0 
       Othere  0.5 0.6 1.6 4.4 2.5 8.8 0.4 1.0 2.3 
Memorandum:           
World  (US$  billion) 42.8 90.8 87.4 22.6 57.2 38.2 19.8 28.8 51.4 
aAnnual average. — bWithout Greece and Ireland. — cIncluding Mexico and Turkey. Data for particular groups of 
developing countries are sometimes incomplete. — dThe following countries are included in the source under 
"dynamic Asian economies": Hong Kong, Malaysia, Republic of Korea, Singapore, Taiwan Province of China, 
Thailand. — eIncluding, inter alia, China, India, Indonesia, the Philippines. 
Source: OECD  (c). 
The increasing regional concentration of FDI outflows of the EU was mainly at the expense of the 
EU's engagement in North America, whose share in FDI outflows dwindled to 18 percent in 1991-
1994 (Table 5). The absolute amount of EU FDI outflows to North America was cut half in the 
early 1990s, as compared with annual average outflows in 1985-1989 (OECD  c). Significantly 
reduced FDI outflows to North America are also reported by Japan since 1991. In contrast to the   18 
 
EU, however, the share of North America in Japanese FDI outflows persistently exceeded 40 
percent (Table 5). 
The drastic decline of EU FDI in North America may be a cyclical phenomenon to some extent. Yet 
it may also indicate that European integration has retarded the globalization of EU investors. It is 
consistent with this interpretation that EU  FDI in Asia remained relatively low, although the 
economies in this region represent the world economy's growth pole and have emerged as most 
competitive suppliers of goods and services. Especially in dynamic Asian economies, EU investors 
have traditionally been underrepresented as compared with Japanese and US investors.20 In 1988-
1990, for example, South and East Asian economies received less than 2 percent of total EU FDI 
outflows, whereas their share in Japanese and US FDI outflows amounted to 6.3 and 12.2 percent 
(Table 5). Although the share of South and East Asian economies in EU FDI outflows increased in 
1991-1994, it remained far below the corresponding figures for Japan and the United States. In 
absolute terms, annual average FDI flows from the EU to South and East Asian economies 
amounted to US$ 4 billion, which fell considerably short of absolute flows from the United States 
(US$ 5.3 billion) and Japan (US$ 7.2 billion) (OECD c).  
Other developing regions such as Latin America, too, attracted a relatively low share of EU FDI 
outflows, as compared with their share in Japanese and US FDI. In other words, developing 
countries as a whole received less attention by EU investors than by major competitors within the 
Triad.21 This suggests that the latter made better use of the chances for cost savings through global 
sourcing, and of profit opportunities through penetrating newly emerging markets. 
Relatively weak efforts towards globalization by EU companies, measured by Japanese and US 
standards, can be attributed at least partly to economic policies in the EU. Direct government 
involvement, e.g., in the automobile industry, and financial incentives to locate production facilities 
in backward regions of EU member countries have discouraged globalization. Trade restrictions, 
e.g., the export restraint agreement on Japanese cars, have retarded the adjustment and restructuring 
of EU companies. At the same time, such restrictions provided a further stimulus to globalization of 
foreign competitors, as FDI offered a means to circumvent export restraints. 
Recent policy initiatives by the EU Commission cannot solve this dilemma. The attempt to support 
coordinated efforts by EU manufacturers and input suppliers to strengthen their innovative capacity 
and competitiveness through joint R&D projects, training programs, and the dissemination of new 
production techniques is likely to remain ineffective for two reasons. First, the targeting of policy 
                                                 
20  For a detailed analysis, see European Commission and UNCTAD-DTCI (1996). 
21  This is also true when absolute FDI outflows to all developing countries are compared. In 1985-1994, absolute 
flows from the EU were persistently below flows from each Japan and the United States. All members of the Triad 
have in common, however, that absolute FDI outflows to all developing countries were higher in 1991-1994 than in 
1985-1987. This indicates that the increased share of EU hosts in overall FDI outflows of the EU, Japan and the 
United States was due to additional FDI, rather than FDI diversion at the expense of developing countries.   19 
 
incentives is becoming increasingly difficult, the more non-EU competitors are operating in the EU 
and the more interlinkages among producers of different origin exist.22 Second, closer cooperation 
among EU companies is insufficient to meet the global challenge of fiercer competition on EU 
markets. Regionalization is no promising alternative to going global in view of greater cost 
efficiency and innovativeness of traditional competitors, notably of Japanese producers,23 and the 
emergence of new competitors, especially in Asia. 
V.  Conclusion: What Policies May Work? 
Economic policy makers are facing a major dilemma in the era of globalization. Competitive 
pressures are mounting as international investors benefit from an increasing number of options to 
realize cost savings and to exploit profit opportunities at a worldwide scale. The implication of 
enterprises being less constrained in their strategic choices is that the economic autonomy of 
governments is shrinking; the scope of economic policy making declines.24 In particular, the 
effectiveness of traditional means to protect non-competitive factors of production is seriously 
eroded. The exceptionally high unemployment in the EU, especially of low-skilled workers, 
indicates that policy constraints are binding not only on the national level, but also on the level of 
large regional integration schemes. It follows that regionalization is insufficient to meet the 
competitive challenges stemming from low-cost labor areas and advanced economies striving for 
technological leadership. 
There appears to be a growing awareness that impaired competitiveness of EU industries and the 
failure to adapt satisfactorily to structural change is at the heart of labor market problems. The EU 
Commission's White Paper "Growth, Competitiveness, Unemployment", published in December 
1993, and the OECD Jobs Study (OECD d) both pay tribute to this emerging consensus. However, 
it is still highly controversial in which way governments can contribute to reducing unemployment 
and regaining technological leadership. 
Protectionist "innovations": A counterproductive strategy 
                                                 
22  It can, of course, be argued that the targeting of incentives on EU companies is unreasonable anyway. Rather than 
supporting the competitiveness of EU companies, economic policy should aim at improving the EU's attractiveness  
for domestic and foreign investors. FDI inflows may well contribute to an improved world market performance of 
EU economies. 
23  For example, the average productivity of assembly plants of European car producers was only half the productivity 
of their competitors in Japan (Womack et al. 1990). The unit cost reductions of about 5 percent expected from the 
Internal Market program were, thus, insufficient to restore competitiveness.  
24 The loss of national economic autonomy is also mentioned by UNCTAD-DTCI (1994) and in several contributions 
to the volume edited by Bailey et al. (1993). Renshaw (1993: 314), for example, notes a " 'regulatory deficit' in the 
sense that national labor market legislation and institutions are becoming increasingly emasculated".   20 
 
The limited effectiveness of conventional protectionist measures has led to an increasing demand 
for stricter and more sophisticated protection. Examples include: trade-related investment measures 
(TRIMs) such as local content requirements imposed on foreign investors, and a multilateral 
harmonization of production standards (e.g., with respect to social and ecological production 
conditions): 
−  TRIMs may render the globalization of foreign competitors more difficult and costly. However, 
the experience with fairly restrictive local content requirements in the case of FDI of Japanese 
car manufacturers in the EU indicates that TRIMs cannot halt the trend towards globalization. 
Rather, they may induce follow-up FDI by foreign input suppliers. Even if the restrictions 
imposed on FDI were prohibitive, evasion would be possible by referring to non-equity 
arrangements such as licensing, cooperation agreements, R & D partnerships, etc. 
−  Common production standards may impede the process of catching up of lower income 
countries, if developing countries are required to adhere to the more demanding social and 
ecological standards of industrialized economies. This may ease the adjustment burden of ailing 
industries for a while, but only at the cost of technologically more advanced industries. The latter 
will suffer from lower demand for their products in newly emerging markets and from upgrading 
of developing countries' exports, if locational characteristics are denied their role in shaping the 
international division of labor. 
In summary, innovative protectionist measures resemble more traditional means: They lead to 
allocative inefficiency and structural rigidity in the protected economies, while the incentives to 
increase productivity through technological innovation are weakened. 
Industrial policy: High costs, uncertain returns 
Governments are inclined to tackle unemployment and insufficient innovativeness by selective 
industrial policies. The drawbacks of high and persistent subsidies granted to ailing industries are 
similar to those mentioned in the context of protectionism: Non-favored sectors have to pay the bill; 
their competitiveness deteriorates due to higher input prices or rising taxes. These costs should no 
longer be ignored. 
The more recent experience of the EU with industrial targeting at high-tech industries is not 
encouraging either. Typically, huge fiscal outlays failed to produce a significantly improved world 
market performance of the promoted industries.25 This suggests that the underlying assumption, 
namely that technological leadership of Japanese competitors is because they enjoy the advantages 
of an unlevel playing field, is not valid. Contrary to conventional wisdom, a disproportionate 
amount of Japanese industrial policy targeting obviously occurred in low growth sectors, and 
                                                 
25  For a more detailed discussion of this issue, see Nunnenkamp et al. (1994).   21 
 
productivity was not enhanced as a result of industrial policy measures (Beason and Weinstein 
1996).  
Government attempts at picking the winners are inherently flawed for various reasons: 
Governments face serious constraints in identifying future growth industries; the targeting of 
support schemes becomes increasingly difficult under conditions of globalized production; lobbying 
by large companies is encouraged, while small innovative enterprises will typically suffer from 
discrimination; and, finally, retaliation by foreign trading partners is highly likely. 
Wage flexibility: Buying time efficiently 
What can policy makers do about unemployment if trade and industrial policy interventions are 
counterproductive? In the short run, there is no alternative but to accept that the trade-off between 
employment and wages has become much more pronounced in the era of globalization. The US 
example shows that the employment chances of low-skilled workers improve considerably if 
relative wages are flexible. Trade unions, especially in the EU, have to agree to higher wage 
flexibility and more wage differentiation. Governments have a major role to play in order to 
overcome incentive problems that have characterized wage bargaining in the past: 
−  Generous unemployment benefits need to be revised to the extent that they provide strong 
disincentives to accept lower paid job offers. 
−  Governments must be credibly committed not to make up for adverse employment effects of 
collective wage agreements. 
Flexible wage policies help to ease employment problems in industries under heavy competitive 
pressure. They cannot halt globalization and the ensuing devaluation of low-skilled labor in 
advanced economies, but they provide a cushion until a long-term strategy becomes effective. 
Human capital formation: The long-term therapy 
From low-skilled labor being the major problem, it follows that a long-term strategy of tackling the 
causes of impaired competitiveness must focus on human capital formation. Advanced economies 
have to strengthen their comparative advantage in skill intensive sectors by improving the 
qualification of the workforce. As globalization implies a permanent change of job requirements, 
human capital has to be built in a way that allows for flexibility and mobility of the workforce. For 
example, existing systems of vocational training, including the widely admired German 
apprenticeship system, may need major revisions, as the life-cycle of vocational skills is shortened 
with proceeding globalization. 
While specific training may be largely left to the market, there is reason for governments to support 
human capital formation especially by improving the quality of basic education, where the social   22 
 
returns are particularly high (Psacharopoulos 1993). A bigger stock of skilled labor delivers social 
benefits in terms of greater flexibility in responding to economic change. However, reforming the 
system of education and training takes considerable time to strengthen the competitive position in 
skill intensive sectors. It is exactly because of these time lags that reforms should no longer be 
postponed.    23 
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Table A1 — The Statistical Impact of FDI and GDP on Trade (Beta coefficients)a 
Year 1.  Germany 
 Exports  Imports 
  GDP FDI GDP FDI 
1989  0.50* 0.44* 0.55* 0.37* 
1990  0.50* 0.48* 0.54* 0.40* 
1991  0.40* 0.55* 0.40* 0.53* 
1992  0.31* 0.72* 0.30* 0.70** 
 2.  Japan 
 Exports Imports 
  GDP FDI GDP FDI 
1989  0.25* 0.68* 0.34* 0.49* 
1990  0.22* 0.64* 0.31* 0.55* 
1991  0.30* 0.59* 0.37* 0.48* 
1992  0.31 0.59*  0.17 0.67* 
  3. United States 
 Exports Imports 
  GDP FDI GDP FDI 
1989  0.56* 0.36* 0.68* 0.15 
1990  0.39* 0.53* 0.45* 0.43* 
1991  0.54* 0.29  0.55* 0.30 
*indicates statistical significance at the 5 percent level. — aBeta coefficients computed from a regression of exports 
(imports) on Gross Domestic Product and FDI flows; all variables in logs; annual data. 
Source: Nunnenkamp et al. (1994). 
 